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Setting aside an award over the mis-application of a choice of 
law clause 
 





In Quarella SpA v Scelta Marble Australia Pty Ltd [2012] SGHC 166, the High Court of 
Singapore (per Prakash J) rejected an application to set aside two related arbitration awards. 
The ground for setting aside was an alleged misinterpretation of a choice of law clause by the 
tribunal. In rejecting the application, the High Court demonstrated its unwillingness to set 
aside an award when the tribunal has considered and respected the choice of law clause 
(regardless of the interpretation the tribunal ultimately preferred). Notably, the High Court 
did not close the door on instances where the tribunal may have failed to apply the choice of 
law clause or expressly refused to apply such a clause.  
 
Facts 
Quarella is an Italian manufacturer and exporter of composite stone products. Scelta is an 
Australian company which supplies composite stone products in Australia. Quarella and 
Scelta entered into an agreement for the distribution of Quarella’s products in Australia (“the 
Agreement”). The relevant clauses read as follows: 
Clause 25 
This Agreement shall be governed by the Uniform Law for International Sales under the 
United Nations Convention of April 11, 1980 (Vienna) and where not applicable by 
Italian law. 
Clause 26 
Any dispute which might arise shall be decided by arbitration to be carried out in 
Singapore in English according to the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce 
in Paris. 
The parties submitted a dispute to ICC arbitration before a sole arbitrator in Singapore. In 
doing so, both parties had initially considered Italian law to govern the dispute, but Quarella 
changed its stand before the hearing of the arbitration and took the stand that the Uniform 
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Law for International Sales under the United Nations Convention of April 11, 1980 (“CISG”) 
applied. As a result, the tribunal heard and considered three preliminary issues: 
(a) whether arguments that the CISG applied should be heard at such a late stage; 
(b) whether Clause 25 of the Agreement was modified by mutual agreement so that 
the CISG did not apply; and 
(c) whether Clause 25 of the Agreement should be interpreted as a direct choice of the 
substantive rules of the CISG by the parties so that the CISG applied even if the 
conditions for the application of the CISG stated in the CISG were not met. 
The tribunal then considered whether the CISG, according to its own internal criteria, 
applied to the Agreement. The tribunal ultimately concluded that Italian law governed the 
dispute and issued two awards (on merits and costs respectively) in Scelta’s favour. Quarella 
brought an application to set aside the two awards under Art 34(2)(a)(iv) and (iii) of the 
Model Law. 
Holding and Comment 
Art 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law 
Quarella argued that the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ 
agreement because the tribunal had failed to comply with Art 17 of the ICC Rules which 
allows parties the liberty of agreeing upon the rules of law to be applied.  
The High Court rejected this argument. It held that this was not a case whether there had 
been a failure to apply the choice of law clause or an express refusal to apply the said clause. 
To the contrary, the reasoning adopted in the award showed that the tribunal had respected 
the choice of law clause, engaged the choice of law clause seriously and interpreted the 
choice of law clause. In the Court’s view, the tribunal’s approach was unimpeachable. 
Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law 
Quarella also argued that the tribunal had exceeded the scope of submission to arbitration 
when it applied Italian law instead of the CISG. The Court similarly rejected this argument 
by holding that this was not a case where the arbitral tribunal had improperly decided 
matters that had not been submitted to it or failed to decide matters that had been submitted 
to it. Quarella’s disagreement with the tribunal’s interpretation of the choice of law clause 
does not fall within the ambit of Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. 
Two observations can be made. First, just as courts would be slow to review awards due to 
purported mistakes of law or fact made by tribunals (such as the construction of substantive 
contractual clauses), courts would similarly be slow to review awards due to purported 
mistakes in the construction of the choice of law clause. This is to be contrasted with the 
exceptional situation where the tribunal had not respected or engaged the choice of law 
clause at all (eg, disregarding or ignoring the parties’ choice of law clause). The High Court 
did not dismiss the possibility of reviewing awards which fall into this latter category. 
Second, subject to any arbitral rules and the lex arbitri, parties can expressly pick the CISG 
as the applicable rules of law governing a contract, even if the CISG does not apply on its own 
accord. If parties were to do so, it is also generally possible for them to pick a national law to 
govern issues that the CISG does not address (eg, capacity of the parties, assignment, set-off, 
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statute of limitation, penalty clauses). This appeared to be the interpretation that Quarella 
had wanted the tribunal to adopt.  
The difficulty with Clause 25 however is the ambiguity in the key phrase that the tribunal had 
identified: “and where not applicable by Italian law”. The tribunal observed that Quarella 
had not identified the criteria to decide when the CISG does not apply and Italian law 
applies. Specifically, this phrase does not appear to suggest that (i) the CISG would apply, 
regardless of whether it is applicable according to its own criteria; and (ii) Italian law would 
govern in relation to specific issues that the CISG does not address. 
